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Abstract 
Attackers increasingly take advantage of naive users who tend to treat non-executable files casually, as if they are 
benign. Such users often open non-executable files although they can conceal and perform malicious operations. 
Existing defensive solutions currently used by organizations prevent executable files from entering organizational 
networks via web browsers or email messages. Therefore, recent advanced persistent threat attacks tend to lever-
age non-executable files such as portable document format (PDF) documents which are used daily by organizations. 
Machine Learning (ML) methods have recently been applied to detect malicious PDF files, however these techniques 
lack an essential element—they cannot be efficiently updated daily. In this study we present an active learning (AL) 
based framework, specifically designed to efficiently assist anti-virus vendors focus their analytical efforts aimed at 
acquiring novel malicious content. This focus is accomplished by identifying and acquiring both new PDF files that 
are most likely malicious and informative benign PDF documents. These files are used for retraining and enhancing 
the knowledge stores of both the detection model and anti-virus. We propose two AL based methods: exploitation 
and combination. Our methods are evaluated and compared to existing AL method (SVM-margin) and to random 
sampling for 10 days, and results indicate that on the last day of the experiment, combination outperformed all of the 
other methods, enriching the signature repository of the anti-virus with almost seven times more new malicious PDF 
files, while each day improving the detection model’s capabilities further. At the same time, it dramatically reduces 
security experts’ efforts by 75 %. Despite this significant reduction, results also indicate that our framework better 
detects new malicious PDF files than leading anti-virus tools commonly used by organizations for protection against 
malicious PDF files.
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Introduction
Cyber-attacks aimed at organizations have increased 
since 2009, with 91  % of all organizations hit by cyber-
attacks in 2013.1 Attacks aimed at organizations usually 
include harmful activities such as stealing confidential 
information, spying and monitoring an organization, and 
1 http://www.humanipo.com/news/37983/91-of-organisations-hit-by-cyber 
attacks-in-2013/.
disrupting an organization’s actions. Attackers may be 
motivated by ideology, criminal intent, a desire for pub-
licity, and more. The vast majority of organizations rely 
heavily on email for internal and external communica-
tion. Thus, email has become a very attractive platform 
from which to initiate cyber-attacks against organiza-
tions. Attackers often use social engineering in order to 
encourage recipients to press a link or open a malicious 
web page or attachment. According to Trend Micro,2 
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and large corporations, are largely dependent upon 
Spear-Phishing3 emails.
An incident in 2014 aimed at the Israeli ministry of 
defense (IMOD) provides an example of a new type of 
targeted cyber-attack involving non-executable files 
attached to an email. According to media reports,4 the 
attackers posed as IMOD representatives and sent email 
messages with a malicious portable document format 
(PDF) file attachment which, when opened, installed a 
Trojan horse enabling the attacker to control the 
computer.
Non-executable files attached to an email are a compo-
nent of many recent cyber-attacks as well. This type of 
attack has grown in popularity, in part because executa-
ble files (e.g., *.EXE) attached to emails are filtered by 
most email servers due to the risk they pose and also 
because non-executables (e.g., *.PDF, *.DOC, etc.) are not 
filtered out and are considered safe by most users. Non-
executable files are written in a format that can be read 
only by a program that is specifically designed for that 
purpose and often cannot be directly executed. For exam-
ple, a PDF file can be read only by a PDF reader such as 
Adobe Reader or Foxit Reader. Unfortunately, non-exe-
cutable files are as dangerous as executable files, since 
their readers can contain vulnerabilities that, when 
exploited, may allow an attacker to perform malicious 
actions on the victim’s computer. F-Secure’s 2008–2009 
report5 indicates that the most popular file types for tar-
geted attacks in 2008–2009 were PDF and Microsoft 
Office files. Since that time, the number of attacks on 
Adobe Reader has grown.6
To prevent such attacks, defensive tools such as fire-
walls, Intrusion detection systems (IDSs), intrusion pre-
vention systems (IPSs), anti-viruses, sandboxes, and 
others are used; however, these tools have limitations in 
the detection of attacks that are launched via non-execut-
able files, particularly when a sophisticated advanced per-
sistent threat attack is executed against an organization. 
These tools rely heavily on the store of known signatures 
maintained by anti-virus vendors and communicated to 
clients. Their main limitation is their inability to detect 
very new unknown types of attacks through known sig-
natures, due to the time lag that exists between when a 
new unknown malware appears and the time anti-virus 
vendors update their clients with the new signature. Dur-
ing this period of time, many computers are vulnerable 






the currently known signatures of the clients of anti-virus 
vendors are consistently not up to date.
In order to effectively analyze tens of thousands of new, 
potentially malicious PDF files on a daily basis, anti-virus 
vendors have integrated a component of a detection 
model based on machine learning (ML) and rule-based 
algorithms [3] into the core of their signature repository 
update activities. However, these solutions are often inef-
fective, because their knowledge base is not adequately 
updated. This occurs because many new, potentially 
malicious PDF files are created every day, and only a lim-
ited number of security researchers are tasked with man-
ually labeling them. Thus, the problem lies in prioritizing 
which PDF files should be acquired, analyzed, and labeled 
by a human expert.7
In this study we present an active learning (AL) based 
framework for frequently updating anti-virus software 
with new malicious PDF files. The framework focuses 
on improving anti-virus tools by labeling those informa-
tive PDF files (potentially malicious or very informative 
benign files) that are most likely to improve the detection 
model’s performance and, in so doing, enrich the signa-
ture repository with as many new PDF malware files as 
possible, further enhancing the detection process. Specif-
ically, the presented framework favors files that contain 
new content. We focus on PCs, the platform most used 
by organizations; mobile platforms are outside the scope 
of this study.
Background
Before we provide a review of existing techniques and 
known methods of attack, it is worthwhile to mention 
that Adobe Reader version X, released in 2011, offers a 
new feature called Protected Mode Adobe Reader 
(PMAR). Protected mode uses a sandbox8 technique in 
order to create an isolated environment for the Acrobat 
Reader rendering agent to run while reading a PDF file. 
As a result, malicious code actions cannot affect the 
operating system. However, most organizations are not 
up-to-date with the newest versions of software, includ-
ing PDF readers,9 and thus they are exposed to many 
well-known attacks that exploit vulnerabilities that exist 
in previous versions of Adobe Reader. In addition, PDF 
files can be utilized for malicious purposes using a variety 
of techniques. In order to explain how PDF files can be 
exploited when created or manipulated by an attacker, we 
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PDF file structure
A PDF is a formatting language first conceived by John 
Warnock, one of the founders of Adobe Systems.10 The 
first version, version 1.0, was introduced in 1993, and 
the most current version is XI11 (11.0.10), was released 
on December 9, 2014. The PDF specification is publi-
cally available,12 and thus can be used by anyone. In 
addition to simple text, a PDF can include images and 
other multimedia elements; a PDF can be password pro-
tected, execute JavaScript, and more. Likewise, the PDF 
is supported in all of the prominent operating systems 
for the PC and mobile platforms (e.g., Microsoft Win-
dows, Linux, MacOS, Android, Windows Phone, and 
iOS).
A PDF file is a set of interconnected objects built hier-
archically. The PDF file structure is depicted in Fig. 1 and 
is comprised of four basic parts according to the Adobe 
PDF Reference13 [4], [5], and [6]:
1. Objects—basic elements in a PDF file:
• Indirect objects—objects referenced by a number
•  Direct objects—objects that are not referenced by 
a number
•  Object types:





Literal string—a sequence of literal char-
acters enclosed with ( ) brackets
Hexadecimal string—a sequence 
of hexadecimal numbers enclosed 
with < > brackets
 – Name—a sequence of 8-bit characters starting 
with /
 – Null—an empty object represented by the key-
word ‘null’
 – Array—an ordered sequence of objects 
enclosed with [] brackets that can be composed 
of any combination of object types, including 
another array
 – Dictionary—an unordered sequence of key-






unique in the dictionary, and values being any 
object type. Most of the indirect objects in a 
PDF document are dictionaries, and dictionaries 
are enclosed with ≪ ≫ brackets.
 – Stream—a special dictionary object followed 
by a sequence of bytes enclosed with the key-
words “stream” and “endstream.” The infor-
mation inside the stream may be compressed 
or encrypted by a filter. The prefix dictionary 
contains information on whether and how to 
decode the stream. Streams are used to store 
data such as images, text, script code, etc.
2. File structure—defines how the objects are accessed 
and how they are updated. A valid PDF file consists 
of the following four parts:
1. Header—the first line of a PDF file which speci-
fies the version number of PDF specification 
which the document uses. Header format is “ % 
PDF-[version number].”
2. Body—the largest section of the file which con-
tains all the PDF objects. The body is used to 
hold all of the document’s data that is shown to 
the user.
Fig. 1 Simple PDF file structure
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3. Cross reference—a table that includes the posi-
tion of every indirect object in the memory and 
allows random access to objects in the file, so 
the application does not need to read the entire 
file to locate a particular object. Each object is 
represented by one entry in the table which is 
always 20 bytes long.
4. Trailer—provides relevant information about 
how the application reading the file should 
find the cross reference table and other special 
objects. The trailer also contains information 
about the number of revisions made to the doc-
ument. All PDF readers should begin reading a 
file from this section.
3. Document structure—defines how objects are logi-
cally and hierarchically organized to reflect the con-
tent of a PDF file. Each page in the document is rep-
resented by a page object which is a dictionary that 
includes references to the page’s content. The root 
object of the hierarchy is the catalog object which is 
also a dictionary.
4. Content streams—objects that contain instructions 
which define the appearance of the page.
Techniques and possible attacks via PDF files
JavaScript code attacks
PDF files can contain client-side JavaScript code for legiti-
mate purposes including: 3D content, form validation, 
and calculations. JavaScript code can reside on a local 
host or remote server, and can be retrieved using/URI or/
GoTo commands [7]. The main indicator for JavaScript 
code embedded in a PDF file is the presence of the/JS key-
word in some dictionaries (as previously explained in the 
previous subsection II-A). However, an object containing 
such a dictionary can be placed in a filtered stream. The/
JS keyword will not be visible in plain text and therefore 
may obstruct detection techniques that rely on these key-
words [8]. The primary goal of the malicious JavaScript 
code inside a PDF file is to exploit a vulnerability in the 
PDF viewer in order to divert the normal execution flow 
to the embedded malicious JavaScript code. This can be 
achieved by performing a heap spraying14 or buffer over-
flow attack implemented through JavaScript. Another 
malicious activity that can be carried out using JavaScript 
is downloading an executable file from the Internet which 
initiates an attack on the victim’s machine once executed. 
Alternatively, JavaScript code can also open a malicious 
website that can perform a variety of malicious operations 
targeting the victim’s machine. According to [9], most 
14 Heap Spraying A technique used in exploits to assist random code execu-
tion.
attacks related to PDF files are conducted using JavaScript 
code embedded inside a PDF.
JavaScript code obfuscation is legitimately used to 
prevent reverse engineering of proprietary applications. 
However, it is also used by attackers to conceal malicious 
JavaScript code and prevent it from being recognized by 
signature based detectors or detectors based on lexical 
analysis of code (such as [7]), and to reduce readability by 
a human security analyst.
Filters are used in PDFs to compress data in order to 
enhance compactness or facilitate encoding. By using 
filters, an attacker can conceal the malicious JavaScript 
code, rendering it undetectable or unreadable. Multi-
ple filters can be applied to a stream, one after the other. 
The filter names used must be declared in the stream 
dictionary. Available filters and their primary purposes 
are discussed by P. Baccas and J. Kittilsen [10], [11]. 
Table 1 summarizes various code obfuscation techniques 
employed by attackers [4].
Embedded file attack
A PDF file can contain other file types within it, including 
HTML, JavaScript, SWF, XLSX, EXE, Microsoft Office 
files, or even another PDF file. An attacker can use this 
functionality in order to embed a malicious file inside a 
benign file. This way, the attacker can leverage the vul-
nerabilities of other file types in order to perform mali-
cious activity, such as exploiting the vulnerability of a 
Flash file embedded within a PDF file. CVE-2010-3654 is 
an example of arbitrary code execution that can be 
achieved by embedding a specially crafted Flash movie 
file (.SWF) into a PDF file. The embedded file can be 
opened when the PDF file is opened using embedded 
JavaScript code or by other techniques such as PDF com-
mands (e.g.,/Launch or/Action/EmbeddedFiles) which 
are usually combined with sophisticated social engineer-
ing techniques.15 Usually, embedded malicious files are 
obfuscated in order to avoid detection. Adobe Reader 
PDF viewer versions 9.3.3 and above restrict file formats 
that can be opened and do not allow the launching of an 
embedded executable file such as *.EXE, *.BAT, or *.CMD 
because of its blacklist which is based on file extension. 
However, Python code (*.PY) is not blacklisted and can 
perform malicious activities when executed.16
Form submission and URI attacks
In 2013, Valentin Hamon [12] presented practical tech-
niques that can be used by attackers to execute malicious 
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of submitting the PDF form from a client to a specific 
server using the/SubmitForm command. Several file for-
mats can be used for that purpose, one of which is the 
forms data format (FDF), the default format based on 
XML. Adobe generates an FDF file from a PDF in order 
to send the data to a specified URL. If the URL belongs to 
a remote web server, it is able to respond. Responses are 
temporarily stored in the  %APPData % directory which 
automatically pops up in the default web browser. An 
attack can be performed by a simple request to a mali-
cious website that will automatically pop up on the web 
browser, and the malicious website can exploit a vulnera-
bility in the user’s web browser. The author also showed 
that security mechanisms such as the protected mode of 
Adobe Reader X or the URL Security Zone Manager of 
the Internet Explorer web browser can be disabled easily 
by changing the corresponding registry key, a change that 
can be implemented with user privileges. However it 
should be noted that vulnerabilities17 that target Adobe 
Reader X and XI have been released18 and are being 
exploited as well. Moreover, a URI19 address can be used 
(instead of a URL) to refer to any file type located 
remotely (both executable and non-executable files, 




19 URI According to RFC2396, URI is a compact string of characters used 
for identifying an abstract or physical resource. It is an extension of URL 
used for identifying any web resource (not limited to web pages).
involves launching a malicious PDF file from a benign 
one. Other attacks described in the paper include an 
attack in which a benign PDF simply submits its form to 
the attacker’s PHP web server. The server searches the 
submitted form header for the Adobe Reader version 
using regular expressions. Once the server identifies the 
user’s Adobe Reader version, it sends back a malicious 
PDF that exploits a vulnerability corresponding to that 
version. The returned PDF is automatically launched. 
Another attack described is the Big Brother attack. When 
the user opens a PDF, it automatically downloads a mali-
cious executable file using the web browser (URI 
address). This attack can be performed prior to the previ-
ously described form submission attack, in order to make 
changes to registry keys that configure the security 
mechanisms discussed above.
Related work
Existing anti-virus software is not adequately effective 
against unknown non-executable malicious PDF files 
[13]. Advanced methods for the detection of new or 
unknown malicious PDF files are based primarily on clas-
sifiers induced by ML algorithms. These methods lever-
age information from features extracted from labeled 
PDF files using static or dynamic analysis. Static analysis 
methods examine and evaluate a suspicious file solely by 
analyzing its code, without actually executing it. Alterna-
tively, dynamic analysis methods execute the file, usually 
in an isolated environment (sandbox), and examine its 
actions and behavior during runtime.
Table 1 Code obfuscation techniques in PDF files that can be used by an attacker
Obfuscation technique Details
Separating malicious code over multiple objects Malicious code is spread among multiple objects. Code chunks are collected and merged and com-
piled to form a malicious piece of code only during runtime. This makes it difficult for static analysis 
detectors to recognize the malicious code
Applying filters Filters are used to conceal malicious code
White space randomization Random white spaces are inserted in the malicious code in order to evade recognition by signature 
based maliciousness detectors. White spaces do not affect the code since JavaScript ignores them
Comment randomization Random comments are inserted in the malicious code in order to evade recognition by signature 
based maliciousness detectors. Comments do not affect the code since JavaScript ignores them
Variable name randomization Changing the variable’s name randomly in order to fool signature based maliciousness detectors
Integer obfuscation Representing numbers in a different way which can be used to hide a specific memory address
String obfuscation Making changes to string in order to make it difficult for a human analyst to understand the code 
(e.g., by splitting string into several substrings)
Function name obfuscation Hiding the name of the function used which can provide a clue about the code’s intention. This is 
done by creating a pointer with a random name, pointing to the required function
Advanced code obfuscation String can hold encrypted malicious code. The decryption process takes place during runtime, just 
before usage. Metadata fields and even the document’s words can also be used to store malicious 
code
Block randomization Changing the syntax of the code but not its action
Dead code Inserting blocks of code that are not intended to be executed
Pointless code Inserting blocks of code that do not perform anything
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In recent years, the need to enhance security in the 
face of attacks based on malicious PDF files has led to 
increased research in this area. Most of the academic 
work focuses on static analysis, since it requires less com-
putational resources and is much faster than dynamic 
analysis. Static analysis methods usually examine and 
inspect the document’s embedded JavaScript code, file 
structure, or metadata (such as the number of specific 
streams, objects, keywords, etc.). However, static analy-
sis has drawbacks as well, including the inability to detect 
well obfuscated code that acts maliciously during runt-
ime, in contrast to dynamic analysis that will likely detect 
that code. Here we present the most relevant studies, 
however a more comprehensive analysis of related work 
can be found in our recent survey study [4].
Srndic and Laskov [7] introduced PJScan,20 a static 
analysis and anomaly detection tool for the detection of 
malicious JavaScript code inside a PDF file. After the 
JavaScript code has been found and extracted, a lexical 
analysis is applied using a JavaScript interpreter. Lexical 
analysis represents the JavaScript code as a sequence of 
tokens. For example, left parenthesis, plus, right paren-
thesis, etc. By using these tokens PJScan tries to induce 
learning detection models that differentiate between 
benign and malicious PDF files. Liu et al. [14] combined 
both static and dynamic analysis to detect potential 
infection attempts in the context of JavaScript execution. 
First, they extract a set of static features, and then they 
insert context monitoring code into a PDF document, a 
code that later cooperates with the runtime monitor used 
for the detection task. Additional work done by Corona 
et  al. [15] in which they presented the Luxor system 
which applied this combination of static and dynamic 
analysis as well. Their idea involved translating the JavaS-
cript code into an API reference pattern, and accumulat-
ing the times of presences for every API reference. By 
doing this they tried to find a discriminative set of refer-
ences that characterizes malware code in order to auto-
matically differentiate this code from benign code within 
PDF files.
Yatamanu et  al. [9] introduced two different static 
methods for clustering PDF files based on tokenization 
of their embedded JavaScript. The article focuses on 
establishing a clustering method for the identification of 
similar scripts that have been obfuscated using different 
techniques. For each examined PDF file, a fingerprint is 
created, consisting of a set of unique JavaScript tokens 
and their frequencies.
Maiorka et al. [8] introduced the PDF Malware Slayer 
(PDFMS), a static analysis tool which characterizes 
20 The source code of PJScan and its underlying library (libPDFJS) can be 
found at http://sourceforge.net/p/pjscan/home/Home/.
PDF files according to the set of embedded keywords 
and their frequencies. The files are characterized by the 
presence of specific chosen keywords, for example:/JS,/
JavaScript,/Encrypt, obj, stream, filter, etc. The main 
contribution is the ability to detect malicious PDF files 
whether or not they contain JavaScript code, unlike pre-
viously described tools which detect malicious files only 
if they contain JavaScript code (e.g., PJScan [7]). How-
ever, an attacker can learn which keywords characterize 
benign files and inject these keywords inside a malicious 
file in order to bypass PDFMS, thus demonstrating the 
tool’s weakness.
Smutz and Stavrou [16] presented PDFRate, a frame-
work for the detection of malicious PDF files which is 
based on meta-features extracted from a document’s 
content. The extracted features include the number of 
font objects, average length of stream objects, and the 
number of lower case characters in the title. In total, 
202 features were chosen for classification.
Pareek and Eswari [17] introduced two different 
static analysis methods that do not rely upon a PDF 
parser to extract data from the file. Alternatively, the 
methods apply the analysis on the whole file, after its 
content is converted to hexadecimal dumps or byte 
sequences. The first method is based on entropy and 
is used to measure the uncertainty or randomness in 
a given dataset, assuming the level of uncertainty of 
a malicious file should be less than that of a benign 
file with a similar format. Low entropy in a file is not 
a strong indicator of maliciousness, however it can be 
a useful detection feature in combination with other 
features. The second method leverages the n-gram 
approach [18] in order to distinguish between benign 
and malicious PDF files.
Srndic and Laskov [6] introduced a method that makes 
use of essential differences in the structural properties 
of malicious and benign PDF files. Their static method 
evaluates documents based on side effects of malicious 
content within their structure by evaluating their struc-
tural paths and the frequencies of these paths. This detec-
tion model was found to be effective at differentiating 
between malicious and benign PDF files and was effective 
against new unknown malicious files that were created 
2 months after the classification model was built.
The following dynamic analysis methods focus on the 
analysis of embedded JavaScript code (which may or may 
not reside in a PDF file) during runtime. All of these 
methods include a dynamic step, either in the feature 
extraction or analysis phase. MDScan [13] and PDF Scru-
tinizer [19] start with a static extraction of the embedded 
JavaScript code from a PDF file and then execute the 
extracted code using a JavaScript engine. The extracted 
JavaScript code is examined during runtime using 
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heuristics in order to detect suspicious or malicious 
activity. Snow et al. [20] presented ShellOS, a framework 
for the detection of code injection attacks based on code 
analysis during runtime. Lu et  al. [21] introduced 
MPScan, a technique that integrates static malware 
detection and dynamic JavaScript de-obfuscation. 
MPScan hooks21 the Adobe Reader’s native JavaScript 
engine; thus embedded codes (JavaScript source and 
operational code) can be extracted during execution and 
evaluated by the static detection module.
While the presented dynamic analysis methods execute 
the JavaScript code in order to detect malicious behav-
ior, they differ in the way that they extract the JavaS-
cript code. Generally speaking, the more exhaustive the 
extraction of JavaScript code is, the better the dynamic 
analysis can be in terms of detection ability. Nevertheless, 
an attempt to extract JavaScript code from a file statically 
may fail and result in the extraction of JavaScript code 
that does not accurately represent the behavior of the 
file. The reasons may be varied; for example, this could 
be due to cases in which the code can be well obfuscated 
or located in irregular locations within the PDF file. 
Dynamic extraction is more robust compared to static 
extraction in these areas.
It is important to clarify that the academic solutions in 
this category do not perform a dynamic analysis on the 
entire file, rather dynamic analysis is only performed on 
the JavaScript code that was extracted from the PDF file. 
This is in contrast to some commercial solutions that 
execute the PDF file and examine its behavior and influ-
ence on the host operating system during runtime (full 
dynamic analysis). Full dynamic analysis consumes signif-
icantly more resources than the dynamic analysis found 
in academic solutions but is probably better at detecting 
malicious PDF files, because it provides a better indica-
tion of the file’s real purpose. Moreover, the full dynamic 
analysis approach is robust against code obfuscation, 
since it does not analyze string code or pretend to extract 
the code from the file. This approach is most like the 
examination of suspicious code by a security expert with 
forensic tools. Wepawet [22], an example of a well-known 
and widely used full-dynamic analysis tool, was pre-
sented in 2010 by Cova et al. In-Nimbo Sandboxing sys-
tem for PDF files, presented by Maas et al. [23], is based 
on conducting vulnerable or malicious computations on 
a virtual machine instances in a remote cloud computing 
environment, and by so doing, preventing the ability of 
malware to affect the host system.
Studies in several domains have successfully applied 
AL in order to improve the efficiency of labeling 
21 Hooking A technique for intercepting functions calls, messages, or events 
passed between software components in order to alter an application or 
operating system behavior.
examples needed to maintain the performance of an 
ML classifier. Unlike random (or passive) learning, in 
which a classifier randomly selects examples from 
which to learn, the ML based classifier actively indicates 
the specific examples which are commonly the most 
informative examples for the training task and should 
be labeled. SVM-Simple-Margin [24] is a current AL 
method considered in our experiments. Active learn-
ing was successfully used to enhance the detection of 
unknown computer worms [25] and malicious execut-
able files targeting the Windows OS [26]. Such methods 
are used in the current study in order to enhance the 
detection of malicious PDF files.
Suggested framework and methods
A framework for improving detection capabilities
Figure  2 illustrates the framework and the process of 
detecting and acquiring new malicious PDF files by main-
taining the updatability of the anti-virus and detection 
model. In order to maximize the suggested framework’s 
contribution, it should be deployed in strategic nodes 
(such as ISPs and gateways of large organizations) over 
the Internet network in an attempt to expand its expo-
sure to as many new files as possible. Widespread deploy-
ment will result in a scenario in which almost every new 
file goes through the framework. If the file is informative 
enough or is assessed as likely being malicious, it will be 
acquired for manual analysis. As Fig.  2 shows, the PDF 
files transported over the Internet are collected and scru-
tinized within our framework {1}. Then, the “known files 
module” filters all the known benign and malicious PDF 
files {2} (according to a white list, reputation systems 
[27], and the anti-virus signature repository).
Then, only the unknown PDF files from the previous 
step are checked for their compatibility with PDF speci-
fications (explained in “Dataset” Section that describes 
the dataset collection) {3}. The incompatible PDF files are 
immediately blocked (since only compatible files are rel-
evant for organizations and individual users). Note that 
the compatibility check is extremely important since it 
blocks many of the malicious files (discussed in “Dataset 
collection” section) from being introduced to the next 
step which is more time consuming and, in some cases, 
might even require manual analysis done by a human 
expert. The remaining PDF files which are compatible 
and unknown are then introduced to the next step. In 
the advanced analysis step {4}, these compatible files are 
transformed into vector form for the advanced check. In 
vector form the files are represented as vectors of the fre-
quencies of structural paths of the PDF files (as will be 
explained in the following sub-section). The detection 
model within this check scrutinizes the PDF files and 
provides two values for each file: a classification decision 
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using the SVM (Support Vector Machine) classification 
algorithm and a distance calculation from the separat-
ing hyperplane using Eq. 1. The AL method acquires files 
which are found to be informative and sends these files 
to an expert for manual analysis and labeling {5}. These 
labeled informative files are being added to the training 
set which is used to induce new and updated detection 
model. By acquiring these informative PDF files, we aim 
to frequently update the anti-virus software by focusing 
the expert’s efforts on labeling PDF files that are most 
likely to be malware or benign PDF files that are expected 
to improve the detection model. Recall that informative 
files are those files that when added to the training set 
improve the detection model’s predictive capabilities and 
enrich the anti-virus signature repository. Accordingly, in 
our context there are two types of files that may be con-
sidered informative. The first type includes files in which 
the classifier has limited confidence as to their classifica-
tion (the probability that they are malicious is very close 
to the probability that they are benign). Acquiring them 
as labeled examples will probably improve the model’s 
detection capabilities. In practical terms, these PDF files 
will have new structural paths or special combinations of 
existing structural paths that represent their execution 
code (inside the binary code of the executable). There-
fore these files will probably lie inside the SVM margin 
and consequently will be acquired by the SVM-Margin 
strategy that selects informative files, both malicious 
and benign, that are a short distance from the separating 
hyperplane.
The second type of informative files includes those that 
lie deep inside the malicious side of the SVM margin and 
are a maximal distance from the separating hyperplane 
according to Eq.  1. These PDF files will be acquired by 
the exploitation method (described later) and are also 
a maximal distance from the labeled files. This distance 
is measured by the KFF calculation that will be further 
explained as well. These informative files are then added 
to the training set {6} for updating and retraining the 
detection model {7}. The files that were labeled as mali-
cious are also added to the anti-virus signature reposi-
tory in order to enrich and maintain its updatability {8}. 
Updating the signature repository also requires an update 
to clients utilizing the anti-virus application. The frame-
work integrates two main phases: training and detection/
updating.
Training
A detection model is trained over an initial training set 
that includes both malicious and benign PDF files. After 
the model is tested over a stream that consists only 
of unknown files that were presented to it on the first 
day, the initial performance of the detection model is 
evaluated.
Fig. 2 The process of maintaining the updatability of the anti-virus tool using AL methods
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Detection and updating
For every unknown PDF file in the stream, the detection 
model provides a classification, while the AL method 
provides a rank representing how informative the file is. 
The framework will consider acquiring the files based on 
these two factors. After being selected and receiving their 
true labels from the expert, the informative PDF files are 
acquired by the training set, and the signature reposi-
tory is updated as well (in cases which the files are mali-
cious). The detection model is retrained over the updated 
and extended training set which now also includes the 
acquired examples that are regarded as being very inform-
ative. At the end of the current day the updated model 
receives a new stream of unknown files on which the 
updated model is once again tested and from which the 
updated model acquires additional informative files. Note 
that the motive is to acquire as many malicious PDF files 
as possible, since such information will maximally update 
the anti-virus tools that protect most organizations.
We employed the SVM classification algorithm using 
the radial basis function (RBF) kernel in a supervised 
learning approach. We used the SVM algorithm for the 
following reasons: (1) SVM has been successfully used to 
detect worms [25, 28], classify malware into species, and 
detect zero day attacks [29]; (2) the trained SVM classi-
fier is a black-box that is hard for an attacker to under-
stand [28]; (3) SVM has proven to be very efficient when 
combined with AL methods [26]; and (4) SVM is known 
for its ability to handle large numbers of features which 
makes it suitable for handling the number of structural 
paths extracted from the PDF files [18]. In our experi-
ments we used Lib-SVM implementation [30] which also 
supports multiclass classification.
Detection of malicious PDF files using structural paths
In order to detect and acquire unknown malicious PDF 
files, we implemented a static analysis approach based 
on the hierarchical structural path feature extraction 
method presented by Šrndic and Laskov [6]. Instead 
of analyzing JavaScript code or any other content, this 
approach makes use of essential differences in the struc-
tural properties of malicious and benign PDF files. It 
parses the PDF files and extracts their structural paths 
which are the paths in the files’ hierarchical object tree 
that characterize a document’s structure. Each structural 
path is analogous to a set of relations between the objects 
within the PDF file. For example, the “…/JS” path means 
that the PDF file contains JavaScript code. The structural 
paths represent the file’s properties and possible actions, 
acting like the file’s genes rather than its current behavior 
which can be postponed or delayed according to specific 
conditions. Their detection model was based on these 
structural paths and was found to be very effective at 
differentiating between malicious and benign PDF files, 
even against new unknown malicious files that were cre-
ated two months after the classification model was built. 
Šrndic and Laskov reported on high TPR and low FPR. 
The method was tested against previous detectors: MDS-
can [13], PJScan [7], ShellOS [20], and PDFMS [8], and 
the comparison clearly demonstrated the efficiency and 
resilience of this method in the detection of new mali-
cious PDF files over other methods.
Figure  3 provides a simple example of the conversion 
of a PDF file into a set of structural paths. The PDF code 
is treated as a tree of objects. Note that only paths of the 
leaves in the structural tree are counted.
When an attacker injects malicious content into the 
PDF file, the file structure inevitably changes. Thus, this 
approach can easily discriminate between benign and 
malicious files. This approach has several advantages. 
First, it is not affected by code obfuscation, filtering, and 
other encryption methods used for hiding and conceal-
ing malicious code in the PDF file, since it doesn’t actu-
ally analyze the embedded JavaScript code. Second, it is 
Fig. 3 Example of the conversion of a PDF file to a set of structural paths
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robust towards mimicry and reverse mimicry attacks [6]. 
Finally, it is very fast and lightweight, since the analysis is 
done statically and does not require execution of the PDF 
file. Because of this, analysis is conducted quite quickly at 
the rate of 28 ms for an average file [6].
Selective sampling and active learning methods
Since our framework aims to provide solutions to real 
problems it must be based on a sophisticated, fast selec-
tive sampling method which also efficiently identifies 
informative files. We compared our proposed AL meth-
ods to other selective sampling methods, and all of these 
methods are described below.
Random selection (random)
While random selection is obviously not an AL method, 
it is at the “lower bound” of the selection methods dis-
cussed. We are unaware of an anti-virus tool that uses 
an AL method for maintaining and improving its updat-
ability. Consequently, we expect that all AL methods will 
perform better than a selection process based on the ran-
dom acquisition of files.
The SVM‑Simple‑Margin AL method (SVM‑Margin)
The SVM-Simple-Margin method [24] (referred to as 
SVM-Margin) is directly related to the SVM classifier. 
Using a kernel function, the SVM implicitly projects 
the training examples into a different (usually a higher 
dimensional) feature space denoted by F. In this space 
there is a set of hypotheses that are consistent with the 
training set, and these hypotheses create a linear sepa-
ration of the training set. From among the consistent 
hypotheses, referred to as the version-space (VS), the 
SVM identifies the best hypothesis with the maximum 
margin. To achieve a situation where the VS contains 
the most accurate and consistent hypothesis, the SVM-
Margin method selects examples from the pool of unla-
beled examples reducing the number of hypotheses. This 
method is based on simple heuristics that depend on the 
relationship between the VS and the SVM with the maxi-
mum margin, because calculating the VS is complex and 
impractical where large datasets are concerned. Exam-
ples that lie closest to the separating hyperplane (inside 
the margin) are more likely to be informative and new to 
the classifier, and these examples are selected for labeling 
and acquisition.
This method, in contrast to ours, selects examples 
according to their distance from the separating hyper-
plane only to explore and acquire the informative files 
without relation to their classified labels, i.e., not specifi-
cally focusing on malware instances. The SVM-Margin 
method is very fast and can be applied to real problems, 
yet SVM-Margin’s authors [24] indicate that this agility is 
achieved, because it is based on a rough approximation 
and relies on assumptions that the VS is fairly symmet-
ric and the hyperplane’s Normal (W) is centrally placed, 
assumptions that have been shown to fail significantly 
[31]. The method may query instances whose hyper-
plane does not intersect the VS and therefore may not 
be informative. The SVM-Margin method for detecting 
instances of PC malware was used by Moskovitch et  al. 
[32, 33] whose preliminary results found that the method 
also assisted in updating the detection model but not the 
anti-virus application itself; however, in this study the 
method was only used for a one day-long trial. We com-
pare its performance to our proposed AL methods over a 
longer period, in a daily process of detection and acqui-
sition experiments that better reflect reality. This serves 
as our baseline AL method, and we expect our method 
to improve the new malicious PDF detection and acquisi-
tion seen in SVM-Margin.
Exploitation: our proposed active learning method
Our method, “Exploitation,” is based on SVM classi-
fier principles and is oriented towards selecting exam-
ples most likely to be malicious that lie furthest from the 
separating hyperplane. Thus, our method supports the 
goal of boosting the signature repository of the anti-virus 
tool by acquiring as much new malware as possible. For 
every file X that is suspected of being malicious, Exploi-
tation rates its distance from the separating hyperplane 
using Eq. 1 based on the Normal of the separating hyper-
plane of the SVM classifier that serves as the detection 
model. As explained above, the separating hyperplane of 
the SVM is represented by W, which is the Normal of the 
separating hyperplane and is actually a linear combina-
tion of the most important examples (supporting vec-
tors), multiplied by LaGrange multipliers (alphas) and by 
the kernel function K that assists in achieving linear sepa-
ration in higher dimensions. Accordingly, the distance 
in Eq. 1 is simply calculated between example X and the 
Normal (W) presented in Eq. 2.
In Fig.  4 the files that were acquired (marked with a 
red circle) are those files that are classified as malicious 
and are at the maximum distance from the separating 
hyperplane. Acquiring several new malicious files that 
are very similar and belong to the same virus family is 
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these files will probably be detected by the same signa-
ture. Thus, acquiring one representative file for this set of 
new malicious files will serve the goal of efficiently updat-
ing the signature repository. In order to enhance the 
signature repository as much as possible, we also check 
the similarity between the selected files using the kernel 
farthest-first (KFF) method suggested by Baram et  al. 
[34] which enables us to avoid acquiring examples that 
are quite similar. Consequently, only the representative 
files that are most likely malicious are selected. In cases 
in which the representative file is detected as malware as 
a result of the manual analysis, all its variants that weren’t 
acquired will be detected when the anti-virus is updated. 
In cases in which these files are not actually variants of 
the same malware, they will be acquired the following 
day (after the detection model has been updated), as 
long as they are still most likely to be malware. In Fig. 4 
it can be observed that there are sets of relatively similar 
files (based on their distance in the kernel space), how-
ever, only the representative files that are most likely to 
be malware are acquired. The SVM classifier defines the 
class margins using a small set of supporting vectors 
(i.e., PDF files). While the usual goal is to improve clas-
sification by uncovering (labeling) files from the margin 
area, our primary goal is to acquire malware in order 
to update the anti-virus. In contrast to SVM-Margin 
which explores examples that lie inside the SVM mar-
gin, Exploitation explores the “malicious side” to discover 
new and unknown malicious files that are essential for 
the frequent update of the anti-virus signature repository, 
a process which occasionally also results in the discov-
ery of benign files (files which will likely become support 
vectors and update the classifier). Figure  4 presents an 
example of a file lying far inside the malicious side that 
was found to be benign. With this method the distance 
calculation required for each instance is fast and equiva-
lent to the time it takes to classify an instance in a SVM 
classifier, thus it is applicable for products working in 
real-time.
Combination: a combined active learning method
The “combination” method lies between SVM-Margin 
and exploitation. On the one hand, the combination 
method begins by acquiring examples based on SVM-
Margin criteria in order to acquire the most informa-
tive PDF files, acquiring both malicious and benign files. 
This exploration phase is important in order to enable 
the detection model to discriminate between malicious 
and benign PDF files. On the other hand, the Combina-
tion method then tries to maximally update the signa-
ture repository in an exploitation phase, drawing on the 
exploitation method. This means that in the early acquisi-
tion period, during the first part of the day, SVM-Margin 
leads, compared to exploitation. As the day progresses, 
Exploitation becomes predominant. However, the 
Combination method, which consists of first conduct-
ing exploration by SVM-Margin and then conducting 
Exploitation, was also applied in the course of the 10 days 
of the experiment, and over a period of days, combina-
tion will perform more exploitation than SVM-Margin. 
This means that on the ith day there is more exploitation 
than on the (i–1)th day. We defined and tracked several 
configurations over the course of several days. Regard-
ing the relation between SVM-Margin and Exploitation, 
we found that a balanced division performs better than 
other divisions (i.e., during the first half of the study, the 
method will acquire more files using SVM-Margin, while 
during the second half of the study, exploitation takes 
the leading role in the acquisition of files). In short, this 
method tries to take the best from both of the previous 
methods.
Note that our combination AL method actually 
repeats in cycles of X days according to the configu-
rations of the administrator, so that in each cycle, the 
combination method starts with more explorative 
phase (SVM-Margin) in which both informative mali-
cious and benign PDF files are being acquired. Then, 
combination conducts more acquisition according to 
the exploitation AL method in order to acquire more 
PDF malware and enrich the antivirus signature reposi-
tory. In our experiments we conducted only one cycle 
of 10 days experiment, yet on a long term, this strategy 
will work on a continuous manner in cycles of 10 days, 
in which every cycle will be both consisted of explora-
tion (SVM-Margin) and exploitation. The administrator 
have the privilege to decide what will be the length of 
the cycles.
Fig. 4 The criteria by which exploitation acquires new unknown 
malicious PDF files. These files lie the farthest from the hyperplane 
and are regarded as representative files
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Evaluation
In this section we present the dataset on which we based 
our experiments and elaborate on the composition of 
the files within the dataset. We also discuss our insights 
regarding the compatibility of the PDF files. At the con-
clusion of this section we present our experimental 




We created a collection of benign and malicious PDF 
files. We acquired a total of 50,908 PDF files consisting of 
45,763 malicious and 5145 benign files. The malicious 
PDF files aimed at compromising the Windows operating 
system, the most commonly attacked system used by 
organizations. The files were collected during the years 
2012–2014 from the four sources presented in Table  2. 
All the files were verified to be labeled correctly as mali-
cious or benign using Kaspersky22 anti-virus.
The benign files were collected from Ben-Gurion Uni-
versity, a very diverse organization that generates an 
enormous number of PDF files from diverse sources, 
including many different academic and administra-
tive departments. Although the entire benign collection 
originated from one institution, it should be noted that 
it is actually quite varied and contains PDF files that are 
substantially different from one another in their content, 
elements, and purpose that were randomly selected from 
the following sources within the university: academic 
papers, automatically generated reports, student assign-
ments, previous exams, administrative forms (also with 
active functionality), architectural renderings and plan-
ning documentation, brochures, and newsletters.
In our recent studies [4], [35] we thoroughly investi-
gated PDF files and found that most malicious PDF files 
(96.5  %) are not compatible with the PDF file format 
specifications (checked with the Adobe PDF Reference23). 




user, and an error message will likely be displayed on the 
screen when an attempt is made to open the file. How-
ever in such cases involving incompatible malicious PDF 
files, the malicious operations will still be executed. A 
common incompatibility observed was located at the end 
of the file between the “startxref” and “ %EOF” lines. This 
line should contain a number serving as a reference (off-
set) to where the last cross reference table section is 
located in the file. In cases of incompatibility, the number 
that appears is incorrect.
We would like to reiterate that incompatible files are 
unreadable, because once they are opened they either 
cause the PDF reader to crash or generate an error mes-
sage sent to the user regarding the corruption of the 
file. However, in cases in which the file is malicious, the 
malicious operation is likely to occur whether or not the 
file has been presented the PDF reader. Regardless as to 
whether the incompatible file is benign or malicious, the 
file cannot be viewed by the user. Thus, there is no reason 
to transfer such files to the user, and we suggest that they 
get blocked. We observed that 96.5  % of the malicious 
files within our large and representative data collection of 
more than 45,000 malicious PDF files were incompatible; 
based on this, we can therefore assume that 96.5 % of all 
malicious PDF files are incompatible. Because of this, 
when one encounters an incompatible PDF file, there is a 
strong chance that it is, in fact, a malicious PDF file.
Our proposed framework uses these observations to 
flag files that can initially be blocked from the network 
of an organization or private computer, since they cannot 
be opened correctly; therefore our ML based framework 
was applied only to the compatible files (6774). Table  2 
presents the number of compatible files in each of our 
collections (bracketed).
Figure  5 presents a general breakdown of the threats 
raised by the compatible malicious PDF files within our 
dataset.
As can be seen, 3  % of the 1629 malicious files were 
classified as containing a Trojan which is a malicious pro-
gram that when executed performs covert actions that 
have not been permitted by the user. 97  % of the mali-
cious files were identified as exploiting some vulnerability 
in one or more PDF readers. More specifically, they 
Table 2 Our collected dataset categorized as malicious, benign, and incompatible PDF files (bracketed)
a https://www.virustotal.com/
Dataset source Year Malicious files Benign files
VirusTotala repository 2012–2014 17,596 (1017) –
Srndic and Laskov [6] 2012 27,757 (437) –
Contagio project 2010 410 (175) –
Internet and Ben-Gurion University (random selection) 2013–2014 0 5145
Total 45,763 (1629) 5145
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exploited 23 unique vulnerabilities, including the follow-
ing common vulnerability and exposures (CVE24): CVE-
2007-3845, CVE-2008-2551, CVE-2009-0927, 
CVE-2010-0188, and CVE-2013-0640. The four digits 
after the “CVE-“represent the year the vulnerability was 
discovered. As can be seen, our dataset contains mali-
cious files that exploit cross-time vulnerabilities. It is 
interesting to note that despite the fact that our dataset 
consists of malicious PDF files that were created from 
2012 to 2014, the files also exploited much older vulnera-
bilities, including some discovered during 2007–2011. 
This indicates that attackers are aware of the fact that 
many organizations are not up-to-date with the newest 
versions of software and thus are exposed to older vul-
nerabilities already discovered, as well as new unknown 
vulnerabilities. In Table 3 we provide brief details regard-
ing the most commonly exploited vulnerabilities men-
tioned above. The table indicates the percentage each 
vulnerability represents of the total dataset.
The percent of malicious PDF files in the final dataset 
after removing incompatible files is 24 %. This percentage 
is likely higher than the actual percentage of malicious 
PDF files found on the web. According to our recent 
study [36] that dealt with the issue of imbalanced datasets 
in the cyber-security domain, the best detection perfor-
mance is achieved when the percentage of malicious PDF 
files in the training set is equal to the percentage in the 
test set. We have adhered to this guideline, thus the per-
centage should not affect the detection and updatability 
24 https://cve.mitre.org/.
capabilities reported upon now. We were unable to find 
any reliable source that published an accurate percentage 
of malicious PDF files on the web. Therefore we will rely 
upon the results of our recent study [36], and when the 
exact percentage is determined, we will adjust both the 
training and test sets to that percentage. In addition, in 
Table 4 we also included the percentage of malicious PDF 
files in previous and relevant studies in the malicious 
PDF detection domain. We have done so in order to com-
pare the way this was handled in previous studies and to 
demonstrate that none of the previous studies addressed 
this issue or seemed to adhere to a figure representing 
the actual percentage of malicious PDF files on the web. 
As can be seen, the average percentage used within these 
studies was 38  % which is very high and not likely rea-
sonable. It is important to understand that many of the 
malicious files on the web haven’t been discovered yet, 
since anti-virus tools are very limited in their detection 
capabilities and discover only relatively similar variants of 
known malwares; in addition, it takes time for anti-virus 
vendors to discover new 0-day malicious files. Therefore 
our percentage (24  %) likely represents the upper rea-
sonable boundary of the actual percentage of malicious 
PDF files. Moreover, in our previous study [26], aimed at 
the detection of malicious executables using ML and AL 
methods, we estimated the malicious executables per-
centage to be approximately 9 %. In that study we there-
fore adjusted our dataset to 9 % malicious files, and our 
methods worked very well, providing high true positive 
rates (TPR) and low false positive rate (FPR) rates. Thus, 
we assume that these methods will be effective in the cur-
rent study as well.
Dataset creation
As was explained previously, in order to detect and 
acquire unknown malicious PDF files, we implemented a 
static analysis approach based on the hierarchical struc-
tural path feature extraction method presented by Šrndic 
and Laskov [6]. Instead of analyzing JavaScript code or 
any other content, this approach makes use of essential 
differences in the structural properties of malicious and 
benign PDF files. Using the PdfFileAnalyzer25 parser we 
parsed the compatible PDF files (both malicious and 
benign, totaling 6774) and extracted all 7963 unique 
paths that were found within our dataset. Each of these 
paths was used as feature. We didn’t apply a feature selec-
tion method, since this number of features can easily be 
handled by the SVM classifier used in our experiments. 
Each PDF file was represented as a vector of Boolean fea-
tures so that the presence (1) or absence (0) of a 
25 http://www.codeproject.com/Articles/450254/PDF-File-Analyzer-With-
Csharp-Parsing-Classes-Vers.
Fig. 5 Breakdown of the threats identified among the malicious PDF 
files found in our dataset
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structural path within a PDF file is represented by 1 or 0 
respectively.
Experimental design
The objective in our main experiment was to evaluate 
and compare the performance of our new AL methods 
to the existing selection method, SVM-Margin, on two 
tasks:
 – Acquiring as many new unknown malicious PDF files 
as possible on a daily basis in order to efficiently enrich 
the signature repository of the anti-virus
 – Updating the predictive capabilities of the detection 
model that serves as the knowledge store of AL meth-
ods and improving its ability to efficiently identify the 
most informative new malicious PDF files
Over a 10-day period, we compared PDF file acquisition 
based on AL methods to random selection based on the 
performance of the detection model. In our acquisition 
experiments we used 6774 compatible PDF files (5145 
benign and 1629 malicious) in our repository and created 
10 randomly selected datasets as each one of them con-
tains 10 subsets of 620 files representing each day’s stream 
of new files. The 574 remaining files were used by the ini-
tial training set to induce the initial model. Note that each 
day’s stream contained 620 PDF files. At first we induced 
the initial model by training it over the 574 known PDF 
files. We then tested it on the first day’s stream. Next, from 
this same stream, the selective sampling method selected 
the most informative PDF files according to that method’s 
criteria. The informative files were sent to an expert who 
labeled them. The files were later acquired by the training 






The CVE Description Percentage
CVE-2007-3845a The version of some PDF readers was found to allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands via certain vectors 
associated with launching malicious code based on the file extension at the end of the URI
49
CVE-2008-2551b The DownloaderActiveX Control in Icona SpA C6 Messenger allows remote attackers to force the download and execu-
tion of arbitrary files via a URL in the prop download url parameter with the propPost download action parameter set 
to “run”
4
CVE-2009-0927c Stack-based buffer overflow in some adobe reader versions allows remote attackers to execute malicious code via a 
crafted argument to the ‘getIcon’ method of a ‘Collab’ object. This executed code can exfiltrate sensitive data to a 
remote server where it can download and execute dangerous payload to the host
5
CVE-2010-0188d Unspecified vulnerability in adobe reader and acrobat allows attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or 
possibly execute malicious code via unknown vectors
6
CVE-2013-0640e Adobe reader and acrobat versions allow remote attackers to execute malicious code or cause a denial of service 
(memory corruption)
32
Table 4 Percentage of malicious PDF files in previous studies
Study Year Core of the study Malicious files percentage
[13] 2011 Dynamic analysis of embedded JavaScript code 9
[7] 2011 Static lexical analysis of embedded JavaScript code 94
[20] 2011 Dynamic analysis of embedded JavaScript code 69
[9] 2012 Static tokenization of embedded JavaScript code 43
[19] 2012 Dynamic analysis of embedded JavaScript code 65
[16] 2012 Static analysis of meta-features 5
[8] 2012 Static analysis of embedded keywords 53
[17] 2013 Static analysis using entropy and n-gram 58
[21] 2013 Dynamic analysis of embedded JavaScript code 29
[6] 2013 Static analysis of structural features 12
Average 38
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set which was enriched with an additional X new inform-
ative files. When a file was found to be malicious, it was 
immediately used to update the signature repository of 
the anti-virus, and an update was also distributed to cli-
ents. The process was repeated over the next 9 days. The 
performance of the detection model was averaged for 10 
runs over the 10 different datasets that were created. Each 
selective sampling method was checked separately on 20 
different acts of file acquisition (each consisting of a dif-
ferent number of PDF files). This means that for each act 
of acquisition, the methods were restricted to acquiring 
a predefined number of files equal to the amounts that 
followed, denoted as X: 10 files, 20 files, and so on (with 
gaps of 10 files), until 160 files, and subsequently at 200, 
250, 300 and 350 files. We also considered the acquisition 
of all the files in the daily stream (referred to as the ALL 
method), which represents an ideal, but impractical way, 
of acquiring all the new files, and more specifically, all the 
malicious PDF files.
The experiment’s steps are summarized as follows
1. Inducing the initial detection model from the initial 
available training set, i.e., training set available up to 
day d (the initial training set includes 574 PDF files)
2. Evaluating the detection model on the stream of day 
(d + 1) to measure its initial performance
3. Introduction of the stream of day (d + 1) to the selec-
tive sampling method which chooses the X most 
informative files according to its criteria and sends 
them to the expert for manual analysis and labeling
4. Acquiring the informative files and adding them to 
the training set, as well as using their extracted signa-
ture to update the anti-virus signature repository
5. Inducing an updated detection model from the 
updated training set and applying the updated model 
on the stream of the next day (d + 2)
This process repeats itself from the first day until the 
tenth day.
Results
We rigorously evaluated the efficiency and effectiveness 
of our framework, comparing four selective sampling 
methods: (1) a well-known existing AL method, termed 
SVM-Simple-Margin (SVM-Margin) and based on [24]; 
our proposed methods (2) exploitation and (3) combi-
nation; and (4) random-selection (random) as a “lower 
bound”. Each method was checked for all 20 acquisition 
amounts and the results were the mean of 10 differ-
ent folds. Due to space limitations we have depicted the 
results of the most representative acquisition amount of 
160 PDF files which is equal to the maximal mean num-
ber of PDF files found in the daily stream.
We now present the results of the core measure in this 
study, the number of new unknown malicious files that 
were discovered and finally acquired into the training 
set and signature repository of the anti-virus software. 
As explained above, each day the framework deals with 
620 new PDF files consisting of about 160 new unknown 
malicious PDF files. Statistically, the more files that are 
selected daily, the more malicious files will be acquired 
daily. Yet, using AL methods, we tried to improve the 
number of malicious files acquired by means of existing 
solutions. More specifically, using our methods (exploi-
tation and combination) we also sought to improve the 
number of files acquired by SVM-Margin.
Figure  6 presents the number of malicious PDF files 
obtained by acquiring 160 files daily by each of the four 
methods during the course of the 10-day experiment. 
Exploitation and combination outperformed the other 
selection methods. Exploitation was the only one that 
showed an increasing trend from the first day, while 
combination showed a decrease in the second day and 
then exhibited an increasing trend on the following days. 
Thus, from days four to 10, it performed like exploitation, 
and during these days they both outperformed the other 
methods (SVM-Margin and random selection). Exploita-
tion was successful at acquiring the maximal number of 
malwares from the 160 files acquired daily and to sup-
port the results presented in Fig.  6 and our claim, we 
performed a single-factor Anova statistical test on the 
acquisition rates achieved by the exploitation and combi-
nation methods. The Anova tests between the AL meth-
ods provided P values lower than the 5 % (alpha) of the 
significance level; thus the difference between the exploi-
tation and combination are statistically significant, con-
firming that exploitation AL method performed better 
than combination in terms of number of malicious PDF 
files acquired.
Fig. 6 The number of malicious PDF files acquired by the framework 
for different methods with acquisition of 160 files daily
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On the first day, the number of new malicious PDF files 
is 128 since the initial detection model was trained on an 
initial set of 574 labeled PDF files that contained 128 mal-
wares. We decided to induce the initial detection model 
on 574 files in order to have a stable detection model with 
sufficient detection performance from the start (92.5  % 
TPR on the first day) that can still be improved through 
our AL based framework.
The superiority of exploitation over combination 
can be observed on the second and third days. During 
these 2 days, combination conducts more exploration in 
regarding to acquisition of informative PDF files (both 
malicious and benign), therefore acquired much less 
malicious PDF files than the exploitation method that is 
oriented towards the malicious PDF files acquisition. On 
the second day, exploitation acquired 10 times more PDF 
malware than combination (140 compare to 14 malicious 
PDF files), and on the third day exploitation acquired 1.6 
times more malicious PDF files than combination (141 
compare to 87). Then, from the fourth day, combination 
performed as well as exploitation in regarding to mali-
cious PDF files acquisition, since the exploitation phase 
of combination have become more dominant along the 
days.”
On the tenth day, using combination and exploitation, 
93.75 and 92.5 % of the acquired files were malicious (150 
and 148 files out of 160); using SVM-Margin, only 13.5 % 
of the acquired files were malicious (22 files out of 160 
which is even less than random). This presents a signifi-
cant improvement of almost 80 % in unknown malware 
acquisition. Note that on the tenth day, using Random, 
only 25  % of the acquired PDF files were malicious (40 
files out of 160). This is far less than the malware acqui-
sition rates achieved by both combination and exploita-
tion. The trend is very clear from the second day at which 
point combination and exploitation each acquired more 
malicious files than the day before—a finding that dem-
onstrates the impact of updating the detection model, 
identifying new malwares, and enriching the signature 
repository of the anti-virus. Moreover, because they are 
different, the acquired malwares are also expected to be 
of higher quality in terms of their contribution to the 
detection model and signature repository.
As far as we could observe, the random selection 
trend was constant, with no improvement in acquisition 
capabilities over the 10  days. While the SVM-Margin 
method showed a decrease in the number of malwares 
acquired through the fifth day, it showed a very negligible 
improvement from the sixth day. It can be seen that the 
performance of our methods was much closer to the ALL 
line which represents the maximum number of malicious 
PDF files that can be acquired each day. This phenom-
enon can be explained by looking at the ways in which 
the methods work. The SVM-Margin acquires examples 
about which the detection model is less confident. Con-
sequently, they are considered to be more informative but 
not necessarily malicious. As was explained previously, 
SVM-Margin selects new informative PDF files inside 
the margin of the SVM. Over time and with improve-
ment of the detection model towards more malicious 
files, it seems that the malicious files are less informative 
(due to the fact that malware writers frequently try to 
use upgraded variants of previous malwares). Since these 
new malwares might not lie inside the margin, SVM-
Margin may actually be acquiring informative benign, 
rather than malicious, files. However, our methods, 
combination and exploitation, are more oriented toward 
acquiring the most informative files and most likely mal-
ware by obtaining informative PDF files from the mali-
cious side of the SVM margin. As a result, an increasing 
number of new malwares are acquired; in addition, if an 
acquired benign file lies deep within the malicious side, it 
is still informative and can be used for learning purposes 
and to improve the next day’s detection capabilities.
Our AL methods outperformed the SVM-Margin 
method and improved the capabilities of acquiring new 
PDF malwares and enriching the signature repository of 
the anti-virus software. In addition, compared to SVM-
Margin, our methods also maintained the predictive 
performance of the detection model that serves as the 
knowledge store of the acquisition process.
Figure 7 presents the TPR levels and their trends dur-
ing the course of the 10-day study. SVM-Margin outper-
formed other selection methods in the TPR measure, 
while our AL methods, combination and exploitation, 
came close to SVM-Margin (SVM-Margin achieved 1 % 
better TPR rates than combination and 2  % better than 
exploitation) and performed better than random. To sup-
port the results presented in Fig.  7 and our claim, we 
performed several single-factor Anova statistical tests 
on the TPR rates achieved by the three AL methods and 
random. The Anova test between the three AL methods 
provided P-Values higher than the 5 % (alpha) of the sig-
nificance level; thus the difference between the AL meth-
ods is not statistically significant, confirming that our AL 
methods performed as well as the exploration method in 
terms of predictive capabilities. While the Anova tests 
between the AL methods and random provided P values 
lower than the 5 % (alpha) of the significance level; thus 
the difference between the AL methods and random is 
statistically significant, confirming that our AL methods 
performed better than random also in terms of predictive 
capabilities. In addition, the performance of the detec-
tion model improves as more files are acquired daily, so 
that on the tenth day of the experiment, the results indi-
cate that by only acquiring a small and well selected set 
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of informative files (25  % of the stream), the detection 
model can achieve TPR levels (97.7 % with SVM-Margin, 
96.7 % with combination, and 96.05 % with exploitation) 
that are quite close to those achieved by acquiring the 
whole stream (98.4 %).
Figure  8 presents the FPR levels of the four acquisi-
tion methods. As can be observed, the FPR rates were 
low and quite similar among the AL methods. A similar 
decreasing FPR trend began to emerge on the second day. 
This decrease indicates an improvement in the detection 
capabilities and the contribution of the AL methods, in 
contrast to the increase in FPR rates observed in random 
from the fifth day. Random had the highest FPR in the 
course of the 10-day period, which indicates its inability 
to select more informative files over the 10 days.
Apart from the second day, combination and exploita-
tion achieved quite similar FPR rates which were slightly 
higher than SVM-Margin. To support the results pre-
sented in Fig.  8 and our claim, we performed several 
single-factor Anova statistical tests on the FPR rates 
achieved by the three AL methods and Random. The 
Anova test between the three AL methods provided P 
values higher than the 5  % (α) of the significance level; 
thus the difference between the AL methods is not sta-
tistically significant, confirming that our AL methods 
performed as well as the exploration method in terms of 
false positives of the predictive capabilities. While The 
Anova tests between the AL methods and random pro-
vided P values lower than the 5 % (α) of the significance 
level; thus the difference between the AL methods and 
random is statistically significant, confirming that our AL 
methods performed better than random also in terms of 
false positives of the predictive capabilities.
On the tenth day, combination and exploitation had an 
FPR of 0.1 %, while SVM-Margin had an FPR of 0.05 %. 
This indicates that our methods, exploitation and com-
bination, performed as well as the SVM-Margin method 
with regard to predictive capabilities (TPR and FPR) but 
much better than SVM-Margin in acquiring a large num-
ber of new PDF malwares daily and in enriching the sig-
nature repository of the anti-virus. On each day of the 
acquisition iteration, we evaluated the learned classifier, 
and the FPR is presented for the 10-day period. A set of 
new unknown files, both malicious and benign, is pre-
sented to the classifier each day, thus the FPR does not 
constantly decrease which would occur if the classifier 
was tested on the same files each day.
We now compare the detection rate of our framework 
with the leading anti-virus tools (those with the top TPR 
rates) commonly used by organizations, utilizing the 
malicious PDF files within our experimental dataset. We 
used VirusTotal26 an anti-virus service that include many 
different anti-virus tools in order to evaluate the detec-
tion rates.
Figure 9 shows that the most accurate anti-virus, Anti-
Vir, had a detection rate of 92.5  %, while our methods 
outperformed all of the anti-viruses in the task of detect-
ing new malicious PDF files. Using our full framework, 
including the SVM based detection model, the AL meth-
ods, and the enhancement process, we achieved a TPR of 
97.7 % using only 25 % of labeled data daily (160 PDF files 
out of 620), which means a reduction of 75 % in security 
experts’ efforts. In a nutshell, our AL based framework 
was able to better induce an updated detection model 
on a daily basis, outperforming all the anti-virus tools 
and managing to accomplish this using only a fraction of 
the new PDF files (25 %)—the most informative portion, 
consisting of the most valuable information required for 
updating the knowledge stores of the detection model 
and anti-virus tools.
26 http://www.virustotal.com.
Fig. 7 The TPR of the framework over the period of 10 days for differ-
ent methods through the acquisition of 160 PDF files daily
Fig. 8 The FPR of the trends of the framework for different methods 
based on acquiring 160 PDF files daily
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These results demonstrate the efficiency of the frame-
work in maintaining and improving the updatability of 
the detection model and ultimately of the anti-virus tool. 
These factors also demonstrate the benefits obtained by 
performing this process on a daily basis—benefits which 
will likely include economic rewards as well.
Discussion and conclusion
We presented a framework for efficiently updating anti-
virus tools with unknown malicious PDF malware files. 
With our updated classifier, we can better detect new 
malicious PDF files that can be utilized to maintain an 
anti-virus tool. Due to the mass creation of new files, 
especially new malicious PDF files, both the anti-virus 
and the detection model (classifier) must be updated with 
new and labeled PDF files. Such labeling is done manually 
by human experts, thus the goal of the AL component is 
to focus expert efforts on labeling PDF files that are more 
likely to be malicious or on PDF files that might add new 
information about benign files. Our proposed framework 
is based on our AL methods (exploitation and combina-
tion), specially designed for acquiring unknown malware. 
The framework seeks to acquire the most informative 
PDF files, benign and malicious, in order to improve clas-
sifier performance, enabling it to frequently discover and 
enrich the signature repository of anti-virus tools with 
new unknown malware.
In general, three of the AL methods performed very 
well at updating the detection model, with our methods, 
combination and exploitation, outperforming SVM-Mar-
gin in the main goal of the study which is the acquisition 
of new unknown malicious PDF files. The evaluation 
of the classifier before and after the daily acquisition 
showed an improvement in the detection rate, and sub-
sequently more new malwares were acquired. On the 
tenth day, Combination acquired almost seven times 
more PDF malwares (150) than the number acquired by 
SVM-Margin (22 PDF malwares) and almost four times 
more PDF malwares than those acquired by the Random 
method (40 PDF malwares). While our combination and 
exploitation methods showed an increasing trend in the 
number of PDF malwares acquired in the course of the 
10 days, SVM-Margin showed unstable and poor perfor-
mance, and random was consistent. Therefore our frame-
work was found to be effective at updating the anti-virus 
software by acquiring the maximum number of malicious 
PDF files. It also maintained a well updated model that is 
aimed at daily detection of new and unknown malicious 
PDF files.
One of our authors is a security expert who works as a 
virus analyst at one of the known anti-virus companies. 
According to his experience it requires up to 30 min for 
a virus analyst to determine whether a file is malicious 
or benign using both static and dynamic tools. There-
fore, our approach was aimed at focusing the experts’ 
efforts on the most informative files. The manual labe-
ling efforts equals the number of files acquired daily 
multiplied by the analysis time (30  min per file). This 
means that if 160 files were acquired per day, 80 h would 
be required each day to analyze all the files. This is the 
equivalent of ten security experts, a reasonable number 
of analysts for an anti-virus company. Anti-virus com-
panies can use this framework, adjust it accordingly 
to suit their needs and resources, and thus acquire the 
desired number of files for analysis. It is also worth not-
ing some of the advantages of our AL methods com-
pared to SVM-Margin and passive learning. First, using 
our AL methods it is possible to acquire fewer files 
while achieving nearly the same detection capabilities 
as other methods; other methods must acquire a larger 
number of malicious files to achieve poorer results. 
Second, our AL methods acquired a greater number of 
malicious PDF files daily than the alternative solutions; 
in so doing, updating the anti-virus software became 
more efficient.
Our developing framework is currently based on a fea-
ture extractor tailored to PDF files (structural paths as 
previously discussed), and consequently our framework 
is limited to providing updating solutions and detection 
capabilities for attacks that affect the structural paths 
within PDF files. Implementing and integrating more 
feature extractors within the framework will result in 
more robust detection and updatability capabilities. An 
additional limitation is the fact that the framework can 
only provide solutions for PDF files, however there are 
many other widely-used document types such as Micro-
soft office files (e.g., *.docx, *.xlsx, *.pptx, *.rtf ) that have 
become popular means for launching cyber-attacks 
aimed at compromising organizations. These types of 
Fig. 9 The TPR of the framework compared to anti-viruses commonly 
used by organizations
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files are substantially different from PDF files, and thus 
the framework must be adapted to cope with the chal-
lenges they pose.
In future work, in addition to additional types of mali-
cious documents we are interested in extending this 
framework to Android applications. Due to their resource 
limitations, mobile devices are extremely dependent on 
anti-virus solutions that are frequently and efficiently 
updated. Quite possibly our suggested AL framework 
could address this problem.
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